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Background: Substance use disorders (SUDs) are a substantial problem in the United States (U.S.), affecting far
more people than receive treatment. This is true broadly and within the U.S. military veteran population, which is
our focus. To increase funding for treatment, the Veterans Health Administration (VA) has implemented several
initiatives over the past decade to direct funds toward SUD treatment, supplementing the unrestricted funds VA
medical centers receive. We study the ‘flypaper effect’ or the extent to which these directed funds have actually
increased SUD treatment spending.
Methods: The study sample included all VA facilities and used observational data spanning years 2002 to 2010.
Data were analyzed with a fixed effects, ordinary least squares specification with monetized workload as the
dependent variable and funding dedicated to SUD specialty clinics the key dependent variable, controlling for
unrestricted funding.
Results: We observed different effects of dedicated SUD specialty clinic funding over the period 2002 to 2008
versus 2009 to 2010. In the earlier period, there is no evidence of a significant portion of the dedicated funding
sticking to its target. In the later period, a substantial proportion—38% in 2009 and 61% in 2010—of funding
dedicated to SUD specialty clinics did translate into increased medical center spending for SUD treatment. In
comparison, only five cents of every dollar of unrestricted funding is spent on SUD treatment.
Conclusions: Relative to unrestricted funding, dedicated funding for SUD treatment was much more effective in
increasing workload, but only in years 2009 and 2010. The differences in those years relative to prior ones may be
due to the observed management focus on SUD and SUD-related treatment in the later years. If true, this suggests
that in a centrally directed healthcare organization such as the VA, funding dedicated to a service is a necessary,
but not sufficient condition for increasing resources expended for that service.
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Substance use disorders (SUDs) are a substantial prob-
lem in the United States (U.S.), and yet treatment seems
to be underprovided, despite its documented benefits
relative to cost. As of 2010, 8.9% of Americans age
twelve and older (23 million individuals) had an identi-
fied substance use problem. However, only 18% (four
million) of them received treatment [1] despite the fact* Correspondence: frakt@bu.edu
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orthat treatment has been shown to be overwhelmingly
cost-effective [2], as well as clinically effective [3].
Substance use is also a common problem among users
of the Veterans Health Administration (VA), which pro-
vides care for U.S. military veterans through an inte-
grated delivery system with salaried physicians [4]. Our
study examined the effect on funding dedicated to VA
SUD treatment on the amount of treatment actually de-
livered between 2002 and 2010. We consider the role of
known changes in management that correlate with ob-
served variation in the degree to which it did so.d. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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large, positive spillovers to society. The annual economic
cost of excessive alcohol use alone has been estimated to
be in the hundreds of billions of dollars [5]. In 1998, the
economic cost of drug abuse in the U.S. was an esti-
mated $143 billion, accounting for medical conse-
quences, lost earnings and productivity, motor vehicle
accidents, and crime [6]. Echoing earlier work [7,8],
Parthasarathy et al. (2001) [9] found that SUD treatment
is associated with a substantial offset effect, a subsequent
reduction in emergency department and inpatient hos-
pital use and costs. In a review of eleven studies, seven
of which included sufficient information to calculate
benefit-to-cost ratios, McCollister and French (2003)
[10] found that benefits exceeded costs by a factor ran-
ging from 1.33 to 23.33. Both Ettner et al. (2006) [2] and
McCollister and French (2003) [10] attribute the major-
ity of benefit to reductions in crime, a large minority to
increases in income, and a smaller minority to avoided
health spending. Basu et al. (2008) [11] found that out-
patient methadone and residential SUD treatment is as-
sociated with a large reduction in armed robberies (0.4
per client per year), the value of which exceeds the cost
of treatment by itself. Although most of the benefits of
SUD treatment are social and economic, the health ben-
efits may be significant enough to offset the costs, at
least at the program level. For example, Wickizer et al.
(2012) [12] studied the expansion of SUD treatment fi-
nanced by the Washington State Medicaid program in
the mid-2000s. They found that healthcare spending
avoided by the state’s Medicaid program due to SUD
treatment almost fully offset the cost of treatment to the
program.
As these studies document, SUD treatment works, but
its benefits are often diffuse, accruing in large part to so-
ciety or broad levels of government and not the patient
or the patient’s particular health services provider.
Therefore, the benefits do not provide a strong incentive
for managers of health systems to devote more resources
to treatment. As Humphreys et al. (2011) [13] wrote, ‘If,
for example, one is held responsible to keep a hospital
budget in balance, spending scarce funds on SUD treat-
ment does not become more attractive just because it
saves money for the prison system.’ Attitudes and beliefs
about SUD patients and treatments may also play a role
in limiting funding and availability of treatment. For ex-
ample, a report by the National Center on Addiction
and Substance Abuse (2000) [14] found that physicians
think other health conditions like hypertension, diabetes,
and depression are far more treatable than substance
use; over 40% of physicians have difficulty discussing
alcohol or prescription drug abuse with patients; and the
leading reason why physicians don’t discuss SUDs with
patients is that they think ‘patients often lie.’ Givenfindings like these, it is not unreasonable to think that
attitudinal factors might contribute toward less SUD
treatment than would be optimal given the cost-benefit
trade-off.
Consequently, because of its positive externalities,
SUD treatment is underprovided relative to its broad
benefits. Indeed, compared to the need for and benefit
of treatment, funding for SUD treatment is modest [15],
accounting for just 1.2% of all U.S. health spending in
2005. Growth in funding for SUD treatment has been at
a rate far below that of total healthcare spending (4.8%
versus 7.9% over 1986 to 2005), reaching $22 billion in
2005 [16].
A natural solution to the problem of underinvestment
in and under-provision of SUD treatment is to place
SUD treatment funding decisions in the hands of a more
centralized authority that has responsibility for all or
more of the areas it affects. If successful, centralized
funding dedicated to SUD treatment would increase the
resources devoted to it. This is precisely what block
grants, like the Substance Abuse Prevention and Treat-
ment Block Grants (SAPTBG) administered by the U.S.
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Admin-
istration (SAMHSA), are designed to do. A similar di-
rected funding effort, which we examine, exists within
the VA.
Across many settings, economists have found that,
relative to unrestricted resources, centrally administered,
dedicated funds have a much larger effect on spending
for the services to which they are targeted, including
SUD treatment. Funds ‘sticking where they hit’ or where
they are targeted is known as a ‘flypaper effect’ in the
public finance economics literature [17]. However, the
flypaper effect may vary in strength because some dedi-
cated funds may not stick. It is important, therefore, for
policymakers and SUD treatment advocates to measure
how much sticks and understand the factors that cause
it to do so. More specifically, the questions we address
are: Are VA dedicated funds allocated to SUD treatment
used for treatment in greater proportion than unre-
stricted funds? If so, to what extent? And what factors
might explain any observed differences in the strength
of flypaper effects over time and relative to non-VA
settings? Though ours is the first study of the flypaper
effect for VA SUD treatment, it has been examined by
others outside the VA. Both Huber et al. (1994) [18] and
Gamkhar and Sim (2001) [19] found that a one dollar
increase in U.S. federal-to-state SUD treatment block
grant funding led to an 80-cent increase in spending on
alcoholism treatment. Jacobson and McGuire (1996)
[20] and Ma et al. (2002) [21] found closer to a dollar-
for-dollar relationship. Other than these studies, there
have been no other investigations of the flypaper effect
for SUD funding.
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capacity, in the period we study (2002 to 2010) the VA
collected considerable data on SUD treatment programs.
Over the same period, the VA initiated several programs
motivated by a unified effort to direct funds toward SUD
and broader mental health treatment. Under provisions
of the Veterans Millennium Health Care and Benefits
Act of 1999 (Pub. Law 106–117), Congress directed
about $30 million between 2000 and 2002 to hiring add-
itional VA SUD treatment staffa. Several years after the
Millenium Act, the Veterans Health Administration
Comprehensive Mental Health Strategic Plan, adopted
in 2004, aimed to remove identified gaps in the VA’s
provision of mental health services [22]. As part of the
VA’s Mental Health Enhancement Initiative, which com-
menced in 2005, the department enhanced funding of
mental health programs generally and SUD-specific
treatment in particular. This was followed up in 2008 by
the VA Mental Health and Other Care Improvement
Act (Pub. Law 110–387) and the adoption of the VA
Uniform Mental Health Services Handbook [23].
Though under various laws and initiatives, these efforts
constituted a more-or-less consistent response to a per-
ceived need to increase mental health and SUD spending
and treatment within the VA.
In total, between 2002 and 2010, the VA directed
about $152 million in centrally administered funds to-
ward hiring additional SUD treatment staff. The degree
to which these funds were used for their intended pur-
pose has not been broadly investigated. Using descriptive
methods very different from the multivariate approach
we take, the U.S. Government Accountability Office
(2006) [24] examined the use of 2005 and 2006 funding
associated with the 2004 VA Mental Health Strategic
Plan, finding that some of the funding was not applied
to its targeted use. The level and geographic targeting
(specific VA facilities) of SUD-directed funding varied
over the period of study, providing an opportunity to
more thoroughly assess the effectiveness of increasing
resources dedicated to treatment within the VA. Our
work is the first such comprehensive assessment.
Methods
The study sample included all VA facilities and used ob-
servational data spanning years 2002 to 2010. We follow
the approach of Jacobson and McGuire (1996) [20] and
estimate the effects of dedicated funding a with fixed
effectsb, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model
with total resources expended on the target service as
the dependent variable and dedicated funding amounts
as the key independent variable, controlling for varia-
tions in the broader budget. This is an important control
because an increase in total resources available to local
policymakers ought to lead to higher spending oneverything, including the target service. Fixed effects
control for permanent differences between localities (VA
medical centers in our application). Additionally, we
have nine years of data, so we include year effects and
interact them with dedicated funding amounts to assess
whether dedicated funds had different effects through
time. We used a Newey-West (1987) [25] variance estima-
tor to correct for autocorrelation and possible hetero-
skedasticity. The equation below specifies the model, where
the unit of analysis is the medical center-year:
monetized workloadð Þm;y
¼ unrestricted medical center budget allocationð Þ
þ βy SUD specialty clinic dedicated fundingð Þm;yþγmþδyþεm;y
The variables in the equation—monetized workload,
unrestricted medical center budget allocation, SUD spe-
cialty clinic dedicated funding—are described in the sub-
sections that follow. In the equation, m indexes medical
centers, y years. The parameters α to δ are estimated by
ordinary least squares (OLS) using Stata 10 [26]. Note
that α is fixed across years and medical centers, β is year
varying, γ are medical center fixed effects, δ are year
fixed effects, and ε is the error term. To estimate the
model we constructed an analytic file consisting of 1,142
medical center-year observations, spanning the years
2002 to 2010. The file includes the variables shown in
Table 1. The construction of each of those variables, and
the data used to do so, is described below.
Monetized workload
The dependent variable, monetized workload, is the
product of the number of visits to the VA medical cen-
ter’s SUD specialty clinics within the year made by VA
patients with SUD diagnoses and an estimate of the cost
of such a visit. The VA Office of Mental Health Opera-
tions Program Evaluation and Resource Center (PERC)
analyzes SUD workload data, and from it we computed
the number of visits made to SUD specialty clinics by
patients with a principal diagnosis of a SUD. Our confi-
dence in the reliability of these workload data is based
on the work by Harris et al. (2010) [27], which found
that the vast majority of patients with these administra-
tive indications of specialty SUD treatment did in fact
receive SUD care.
To monetize workload, we used a national average
cost per visit derived from estimates of VA staff cost per
visit, computed from VA staffing levels, wage, fringe,
and indirect cost data from VA administrative sources.
We computed a different national average cost per visit
separately for each year as follows. First, for the denom-
inator (visits), we summed our workload measure across
medical centers within year.
The cost per visit numerator (SUD specialty clinic
cost) was computed based on VA SUD specialty clinic
Table 1 Variable definitions and univariate statistics
Variable Mean (SD) [Min–Max]
Dependent variable
Monetized SUD clinic
workload
$2,568,794
($2,243,658)
[$487 –
$12,500,000]
Independent variables(a)
Unrestricted budget
allocation
22,300,000
(17,500,000)
[936,168 –
114,000,000]
SUD clinics funding x 2002 7,708 (50,316) [0 – 495,300]
SUD clinics funding x 2005 7,214 (39,977) [0 – 344,759]
SUD clinics funding x 2006 24,614 (101,506) [0 – 976,527]
SUD clinics funding x 2007 36,362 (145,709) [0 – 1,287,950]
SUD clinics funding x 2008 25,025 (122,373) [0 – 1,396,928]
SUD clinics funding x 2009 16,493 (95,028) [0 – 1,096,928]
SUD clinics funding x 2010 16,493 (95,028) [0 – 1,096,928]
(a) All years are binary variables, 1 for the year indicated, 0 otherwise.
N=1,142 year-station observations. Year and station fixed effects not shown.
Source: Authors’ tabulation of study data.
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costs. We obtained VA SUD specialty treatment staffing
data from the Drug and Alcohol Program Survey
(DAPS), conducted in 2000, 2003, 2006, 2008, and 2010
by PERC [28-32]. For each medical center, these data
include full-time equivalents (FTEs) for 15 types of staff
(psychiatrist, physician, psychologist, physician assistant/
nurse practitioner, RN/clinical nurse specialist, LP nurse/
LV nurse, nursing assistant, social worker, addiction
therapist/counselor (non-MSW), psychology/social work/
rehabilitation tech or aide, pharmacist, recreational the-
rapist, vocational rehabilitation specialist, secretary/ad-
ministrative assistant/clerk, other). We aggregated these
15 types into four (medical management, advanced degree
counselors, non-advanced degree counselors, support
staff ) and interpolated to produce national total counts of
FTEs by these four staff types for all years 2002 to 2010,
inclusive.
We obtained medical center and staff-type level total
salary cost and hours data from the VA’s Account Level
Budgeter Cost Center file, a VA accounting file validated
for this purpose [33]. With these, we computed the
average annual salary for each of the four aggregated
staff types (medical management, advanced degree coun-
selors, non-advanced degree counselors, support staff ).
We monetized the SUD treatment staff FTE counts by
multiplying by these constructed average salaries and
summing across staff type. We then scaled the resulting
staff costs up for fringe and overhead using values from
the Alcohol and Drug Services Study, a nationally repre-
sentative study that collected the cost of providing care
at substance abuse treatment facilities [34]c.Independent variables
With the exception of 2003 and 2004, between 2002 and
2010 (inclusive), medical centers received SUD treatment-
dedicated funds. PERC tracked the precise amounts of
dedicated SUD treatment funding allocated in each of
those years. These year-specific SUD specialty dedicated
funding variables are our key independent variables. (See
the ‘SUD clinics funding’ variables in Table 1).
Because they also influence the level of resources
devoted to SUD treatment, it is important to control for
unrestricted funds. In the VA, unrestricted funds take
the form of an allocation by Congress that is first distrib-
uted by formula to the 21 regional Veterans Integrated
Service Networks (VISNs). VISN directors then divide
their allocation among medical centers within each of
their regions in ways that potentially depend on needs
and priorities of the VISN and medical centers. Conse-
quently, medical centers’ commitment to or ambition for
SUD treatment can be a causal factor in the amount of
unrestricted funds they receive. Likewise, unrestricted
funds are a causal factor in amount of SUD treatment
provided. In other words, unrestricted funds and funding
allocated to SUD treatment are jointly determined. Be-
cause our interest is in the degree to which unrestricted
funds influence SUD treatment workload, we use an
approach developed by Pizer et al. (2004) [35] to extract
a measure of unrestricted funds that cannot be caused
by same-year changes in medical center commitment to
SUD treatment. The method is based on assigning
VISN-level funds to medical centers using the prior
year’s distribution. See Pizer et al. (2004) [35] for details.
Results
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the variables
used in our study, based on the year-medical center file
described above. All figures are in nominal dollars. The
dependent variable is monetized SUD clinic workload.
The independent variables are the medical centers’ unre-
stricted budget allocations and the dedicated funds for
SUD by year. Notice that there was no dedicated SUD
clinic funding in years 2003 or 2004. There was consid-
erable variation in the level of dedicated funds by med-
ical center, as reflected in the large standard deviations
and min–max range of the dedicated funding variables.
Figure 1 shows the total dedicated SUD clinic funding
by year. Funding level peaked in 2007.
In Table 2, we provide OLS-estimated coefficients,
standard errors, and two measures of statistical signifi-
cance (one for the coefficient relative to zero and one
for the coefficient relative to that for the unrestricted
budget allocation). The unrestricted budget allocation
has a positive and highly significant effect, as one would
expect. More unrestricted funding is associated with
more resources devoted to SUD clinics, at a rate of
Figure 1 Dedicated SUD specialty clinic funding, by year.
Source: Authors’ calculations using study data.
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Figure 2 SUD clinic funding coefficients and 95% confidence
intervals.
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cated SUD clinic funding are not statistically significant
relative to zero or relative to the unrestricted budget al-
location coefficient. The exceptions are in years 2009
and 2010. In those years, funding dedicated to SUD
clinics was statistically significant and positively associ-
ated with monetized workload in SUD clinics. In 2009,
38 cents of each dollar dedicated to SUD clinics trans-
lated into additional workload. In 2010, 61 cents did so.
Both are substantially higher than the five cents of each
dollar of unrestricted budget allocation that is used for
SUD treatment.
Figure 2 illustrates the SUD clinics funding coefficients
shown in Table 2, as well as their 95% confidence inter-
vals. Over time, a greater proportion of dedicated funding
was applied to SUD treatment.Table 2 Monetized workload regression
Variable Coefficient
(std. err.)
P-value
relative to 0
P-value relative
to coefficient
on unrestricted
budget allocation
Unrestricted
budget allocation
0.049 (0.0048) 0.00 -
SUD clinics
funding x 2002
−0.061 (0.43) 0.89 0.80
SUD clinics
funding x 2005
−0.19 (0.41) 0.64 0.55
SUD clinics
funding x 2006
0.089 (0.22) 0.69 0.86
SUD clinics
funding x 2007
0.13 (0.14) 0.34 0.55
SUD clinics
funding x 2008
0.23 (0.13) 0.081 0.17
SUD clinics
funding x 2009
0.38 (0.19) 0.05 0.09
SUD clinics
funding x 2010
0.61 (0.24) 0.01 0.02
R2 = 0.52
N=1,142 year-station observations. Year and station fixed effects not shown.Discussion
Providing dedicated funding for SUD treatment from a
central authority potentially addresses one problem and
raises another. It potentially addresses the fact that SUD
treatment has positive externalities from which local
healthcare managers do not benefit (and of which they
may not even be aware). Consequently, local decision
making about the appropriate level of resources to de-
vote to SUD treatment can lead to under-provision of
care. Though dedicated funding can increase spending
on SUD treatment, it only does so to the extent that it
does not offset unrestricted funds. The key question
about dedicated funding schemes is: how much dedi-
cated funding sticks where it hits, both in absolute terms
and relative to unrestricted funding? Or, how big is the
‘flypaper’ effect?
We addressed this question in the context of SUD treat-
ment within the VA and found different effects over the
period 2002 to 2008 versus 2009 to 2010. In the earlier
period, there is no evidence of a significant portion of the
dedicated funding sticking to its target, SUD specialty
clinics. In the later period, a substantial proportion—38%
in 2009 and 61% in 2010—of funding dedicated to SUD
specialty clinics did translate into increased medical center
spending for SUD treatment. Relative to a dollar of unre-
stricted funding, only five cents of which is spent on SUD
specialty treatment, according to our estimates, dedicated
funding has large flypaper effects. But why are such effects
absent prior to 2009?
One explanation is that in 2002 to 2008 dedicated
funding targeted treatment in SUD specialty clinics only,
whereas by 2009 to 2010 there was an effort to increase
SUD treatment provided in other mental health settings.
This coincides with a longer effort to bolster VA mental
health, including a focus by VA Secretary Shinseki on
combating homelessness [36], a problem closely tied to
substance use [37]. The Veterans Health Administration
Comprehensive Mental Health Strategic Plan, adopted
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provision of mental health services [22]. As part of the
VA’s 2005 Mental Health Enhancement Initiative, The
VA enhanced funding of mental health programs gener-
ally. This was followed up in 2008 by the VA Mental
Health and Other Care Improvement Act (Pub. Law
110–387) and the adoption of the VA Uniform Mental
Health Services Handbook [23]. It is possible that in the
early years of our study and before mental health clinics
received all of these additional supports, funds dedicated
to SUD specialty clinics were redirected to functions
within mental health departments. Humphreys et al.
(1997) [38] noted diversion of SUD treatment funds to
other uses within VA medical centers has been observed.
In 2009 and 2010, with separate funds dedicated to SUD
treatment outside specialty clinics and within mental
health, perhaps there was less of a need for medical
centers to divert funds dedicated to SUD specialty clinics.
Also, the VA Uniform Mental Health Services Handbook,
released in 2009, explicitly required and monitored
availability of intensive outpatient and residential SUD
treatment, including opioid agonist treatment, and these
explicit policy requirements may have increased priori-
tization of SUD programs in funding decisions.
Another possibility is that a longer duration focus on
building SUD treatment capacity also increases stake-
holder investment. Local stakeholders may become more
numerous and experienced, which could translate into
better advocacy for resources. If this is the case, then
one should expect flypaper effects to grow over time,
which is what we found. We also considered the possi-
bility that monitoring of use of dedicated funds changed
over time. However, discussion with PERC staff did not
reveal obvious changes that seemed to correlate with the
timing of our findings.
Our work raises another interesting question: why do
we find flypaper effects substantially below those docu-
mented for state agencies? Huber et al. (1994) [18],
Gamkhar and Sim (2001) [19], Jacobson and McGuire
(1996) [20], and Ma et al. (2002) [21] all found that a
dollar of SAPTBG funding led to at least 80 cents of
additional spending for SUD treatment, yet we find, at
most, a 61 cents on the dollar effect. Methodological
differences cannot be discounted. In addition, Keith
Humphreys, former Senior Policy Advisor at the White
House Office of National Drug Control Policy, offered
two other, possible explanations for the difference (per-
sonal communication). First, in some cases, SAPTBG
funding is often directed toward mono-mission agencies.
As such, there is no scope for diversion toward other
purposes within the agency. In contrast, VA dedicated
funding is always directed toward multi-mission medical
centers. That at least provides the necessary conditions for
diversion and also makes use of funds harder to monitor.Second, in many states (Arkansas being one) agencies that
receive SAPTBG funds are not substantially funded in any
other way. Consequently, there is no unrestricted funding
to redirect that could offset SAPTBG funds.
The VA can’t be made to resemble state agencies that
receive SAPTBG funds. It is a multi-mission agency
tasked with providing comprehensive healthcare rather
than just SUD treatment. Cordoning off SUD funding,
as in state agencies, would discourage integration of
SUD treatment with general medical care and would en-
courage the continued stigma of SUDs. Thus, eliminat-
ing the fungibility of VA centralized funds as in state
agencies is counter to aspects of the VA mission. What,
then, could the VA do to further increase the flypaper ef-
fect for centralized SUD funding initiatives? First, efforts
to reduce conflict between local and central priorities
should improve the ‘stick’ of centralized funding. This
might be accomplished by ensuring that responsibility
for implementation of centralized initiatives is held by
those making funding decisions. Second, implementation
of centralized initiatives could be monitored within the
overall context of SUD staffing and programming, rather
than separately.
We note that based on experience with implementa-
tion of these initiatives, VA has changed practices along
these lines. In 2011, VA realigned its central office to
place responsibility for implementation of centralized
funding initiatives under the same leadership responsible
for management of the local unrestricted medical center
budgets. Additionally in 2011, to support adoption of the
Uniform Mental Health Services Handbook, VA imple-
mented a monitoring and quality improvement program
including an intranet-based Mental Health Information
System with over 200 measures indexing the level of deliv-
ery of services outlined in the Handbook, and a technical
assistance and site visit program that helps facilities iden-
tify and correct deficiencies in mental health services
delivery. Both of these modifications increase the account-
ability of the local leadership who manage the unrestricted
budgets for SUD service delivery and centralized initiative
implementation. The VA has also expanded its monitoring
of centralized initiatives to track not only whether central-
ized initiative funding was spent on its designated pur-
pose, but also overall staffing levels, filling of vacant
staffing positions, and workload across SUD and other
mental health treatment domains to ensure that initiative-
driven expansions are not at the expense of related
services.
There are a few, final points we wish to emphasize.
First, one limitation of our work is that the dedicated
funding figures available for this study are the amounts
that were sent to medical centers. Though it is known
that some medical centers returned some of the funding
because they were unable to use it [24], we have no
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extent this occurred. Related, our work suggests that
some of the funding intended for specialty SUD treat-
ment was used for other purposes. Likely much of it was
retained for broader mental healthcare delivery and/or
for SUD treatment in non-specialty settings. At this
time, the data resources within the VA are insufficiently
mature to conduct an analysis of broader mental health
or SUD treatment in non-specialty settings similar to
that presented above for specialty SUD treatment. This
is an area worthy of future investigation.
Last, but certainly not least, we do not mean to imply
that a flypaper effect that is below one is necessarily bad.
In fact, as we pointed out, only five cents of every dollar
of unrestricted funding is spent on SUD treatment. Rela-
tive to this, the degree to which funds dedicated to SUD
treatment hit their target in 2009 and 2010 was very
large. Still, it never reached close to unity, suggesting
that some of the funds were used for other purposes.
Medical center directors who redirect some SUD
funding to other purposes likely have good reason to do
so. The care those redirected funds support benefits
veterans, and may even be used for SUD treatment in
non-specialty settings. Though we can only speculate
why (as we did above), the flypaper effect of VA dedi-
cated SUD funding has gone up over time. To the extent
that central administrators aim to increase resources for
SUD treatment, that is probably welcome news to them.
Conclusions
Relative to unrestricted funding, dedicated funding for
SUD treatment was much more effective in increasing
workload, but only in years 2009 and 2010. The diffe-
rences in those years relative to prior ones may be due
to an observed management focus on SUD and SUD-
related treatment in the later years. If true, this suggests
that in a centrally directed healthcare organization such
as the VA, funding dedicated to a service is a necessary,
but not sufficient condition for increasing resources
expended for that service.
Endnotes
aDollar figures in this paragraph and next were calcu-
lated by the authors based on data provided by the VA
Office of Mental Health Operations Program Evaluation
and Resource Center. Those data are described in the
Methods and Data section.
bWe conducted a Hausman specification test of fixed vs.
random effects, and that it overwhelmingly rejected the
hypothesis that the difference in fixed and random effects
coefficients was not systematic (P-value < 0.0001). Hence,
a random effects specification was rejected.
cWe used one, national rate rather than station-specific
rates from the VA because Barnett and Berger (2003) [39]found that VA station-specific overhead rates vary widely
‘due to the differences in the definition of direct costs used
by different facilities.’ The inpatient treatment overhead
rate derived from ADSS is almost the same as that from
the VA-specific one, 0.63 from ADSS vs. 0.57 derived from
Barnett and Berger (2003) [39].
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